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We develop a model of the labor market where ﬁrms incur an ad-
justment cost when one of their workers quits, and males and females
form households assortatively by skill. We show how this environ-
ment can lead to an economy where females earn less and drop out
more frequently than equally skilled males in equilibrium, even when
males and females constitute ex-ante identical populations. We then
examine how diﬀerent government homecare subsidy schemes may af-
fect such gender inequality in the labor market. We show that the
eﬀect of government homecare subsidy schemes on gender inequality
depends crucially on the form in which the subsidy is given and to
whom it is allocated.
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11 Introduction
It is well documented that working women earn lower wages than working
men, and that women have substantially lower labor force participation rates
than men.1 Moreover, these gender diﬀerences even appear to hold at the
highest skill levels of the labor market. For example, Wood, Corcoran, and
Courant (1993) ﬁnd that even in the very highly select sample of University
of Michigan Law School graduates, the ratio of female to male earnings for
working lawyers ﬁfteen years out of law school is roughly 0.61, and female
lawyers spent signiﬁcantly more of their time not working to care for children
and/or working only part-time than their male counterparts. In this paper,
we propose a new model describing how such inequality can arise as a result of
household decisionmaking with respect to how to supply necessary homecare.
We then discuss how such inequality may be aﬀected by diﬀerent types of
government homecare subsidy programs.
Earlier theoretical research on gender inequality (Becker, 1981, 1985;
Lazear and Rosen, 1990) primarily examined how intrinsic gender diﬀerences
in preferences or skills, even if quite small, could lead to large diﬀerences in
behavior and labor market outcomes across genders. However, more recent
literature examines how gender inequality can arise in equilibrium through
self-fulﬁlling expectations, even when there are no ex-ante diﬀerences be-
tween men and women. For example, in Francois (1998), the labor market
is divided into two types of jobs—those paying piece rates, and those paying
eﬃciency wages that ensure workers do not shirk. He shows that if one, and
only one member of a household has an eﬃciency wage job, then such house-
holds ﬁnd it optimal for the lower paid household member to work less in the
labor market but supply more homecare services in return for more monetary
transfers from the higher paid household member. This means that if each
ﬁrm believes other ﬁrms do not hire females to the eﬃciency wage jobs, it
also ﬁnds it optimal to not hire females to an eﬃciency wage job, as by doing
so, it can ensure that it will never be the case that more than one household
member has a high-paying eﬃciency wage job, which increases the cost of
losing that high-paying job, meaning it can oﬀer a lower eﬃciency wage and
1There is a large empirical literature reinforcing this basic point that there exists sub-
stantial gender diﬀerences in wage and labor market participation both across time and
across countries. Other examples include Corcoran and Duncan (1979), the papers con-
tained in Layard and Mincer (1985), Goldin and Polacheck (1987), O’Neill and Polachek
(1993), Kuhn and Weinberger (2004).
2still ensure optimal eﬀort.
Subsequently, Lommerud and Vagstad (2000) develop a model showing
that if ﬁrms expect that females do more household work at the expense of
eﬀort in the workplace than do males, ﬁrms may impose tougher promotion
standards on women than men, which can cause ﬁrm expectations to be self-
fulﬁlling in equilibrium. Albanesi and Olivetti (2006) explore how incentive
problems can amplify gender diﬀerences in earnings due to gender diﬀerences
in time spent on home production, which in turn can also lead to self-fulﬁlling
feedback mechanism.2 Similar to Lommerud and Vagstad (2000), Albanesi
and Olivetti (2006), and especially Francois (1998), this paper develops a
simple model for the competitive labor market where males and females
form households that share both resources and homecare requirements, and
gender inequality arises as a result of a self-fulﬁlling equilibrium. However,
the underlying mechanisms that cause the gender inequality to arise in our
model diﬀer from those in these other papers. Moreover, also similar to
Francois (1998), we examine how government provision of homecare subsidies
may aﬀect gender labor market inequality. However, while such subsidies
necessarily decrease gender inequality in the labor market in Francois’ model,
the eﬀects of such subsidies are more complicated in our model presented
below.
In our model, men and women form households, where the total income
earned by the household is shared among the two members and either house-
hold member has the option of withdrawing from the labor market in order
to specialize in homecare activities (e.g. raising of children). In the environ-
ment we examine, individuals diﬀer in their labor market productivity, but
the distribution of labor market productivity is identical between males and
females. After joining the labor market, males and females form households
through assortative matching—where the most productive male workers form
households with the most productive female workers and so on down.
Households then diﬀer in their required amount of homecare, reﬂecting
the notion that some households have more children, have children or other
relatives who turn out to have special needs, or simply demand higher quality
childcare. After forming a household and learning their required amount of
homecare, each household must decide whether both members should keep
working and then purchase their required homecare in the marketplace, or
2Also see Engineer and Welling (1999) for a potential coordination problem in the
marriage market due to the timing of human capital accumulation.
3whether one member should drop out of the labor market and supply this
required homecare internally. Employers are able to perfectly observe each
worker’s productivity, but not each workers’ household’s required amount of
homecare. The key assumption is that ﬁrms also have to incur an adjustment
cost if one of their hired workers subsequently chooses to leave the labor
market (e.g. there exist hiring and recruiting costs, training costs, and lost
ﬁrm speciﬁc human capital). Given this cost, the expected value to a ﬁrm
for hiring a worker of any given productivity level will decrease in the ﬁrm’s
belief regarding whether that worker will subsequently leave the labor market
sometime after being hired. Therefore, if ﬁrms believe that females are more
likely to leave the labor market than equally skilled males, they will pay
females less than equally skilled males. Such pay diﬀerentials across genders
will then cause ﬁrms’ beliefs to be conﬁrmed in equilibrium, since the lower
wage paid to females compared to males at any given skill level will make it
optimal for households to choose the female member to exit the labor market
if the household’s required homecare turns out to be suﬃciently high.
Given that a key source of the gender wage and labor market participa-
tion inequality that arises in this model is the cost of purchasing homecare
services from the market, a natural question to ask is how gender inequality
in this environment will be aﬀected if the government chooses to provide
or otherwise subsidize homecare services to some or all households. The
second part of the paper looks at this question with respect to a variety
of possible homecare subsidy schemes. The results of this analysis suggest
that government provision of homecare subsidies will generally not be able
to eradicate gender wage and participation inequality, and moreover, some
reasonable subsidy schemes can very plausibly lead to increases in wage and
participation inequality between equally skilled workers of diﬀerent genders.
Intuitively, government subsidy of homecare services will not generally al-
ter each household’s decision regarding who should stay home if homecare
requirements, after accounting for the government subsidy, still turn out to
be high. Moreover, while government subsidy of homecare beneﬁts may or
may not increase the incentive for females to stay in the labor market (de-
pending on whether such subsidies are given only to dual-career households
or to all households with signiﬁcant required homecare), the taxes on labor
earnings required to pay for these homecare subsidies will generally decrease
the incentive for females to stay in the labor market. If the negative labor
supply incentive associated with the taxes on labor earnings outweigh any
increased participation incentive due to the structure of the subsidy, females
4will drop out of the labor market at higher rates, which will further increase
the gender wage and participation gap.3
In general it is not trivial to see the net eﬀect of government subsidy
of homecare services on gender wage and participation inequality in this
environment, as it depends on how the government of homecare subsidy
program is structured, the distributions of workers’ productivities, and the
distribution of required homecare across households. However, we show that
if the average value of worker productivity is higher than the average cost
of purchasing the required childcare, then an in-kind childcare subsidy given
only to dual-career households will unambiguously reduce gender wage and
participation inequality in our environment.
2 Model
Say society consists of a continuum of individuals, where individuals are
each characterized by their gender s and type x. Let {m,f} be the set of
genders, where m indicates male and f indicates female. An individual’s
type represents his or her productivity in the labor market. Let [x,x] ⊂ R+
be the set of all feasible types for both males and females. Assume males and
females are distributed identically across the same type distribution G, where
the total measure of males (females) is normalized to one: G([x,x]) =1. After
joining the labor market, assume that males and females form households
consisting of one male and one female, where these households are formed
assortatively, meaning households consist of a male and a female of the same
type x.
By working, assume an individual pays a utility cost of e representing
the lost leisure time associated with time spent working. Furthermore, as-
sume that once a household is formed, a fraction ρ ∈ (0,1) of households
have children, meaning they must supply some amount of required childcare.
This required childcare can either be purchased in the market, or supplied
privately by one of the household members. We assume that households with
children can diﬀer in the amount of childcare they require, which can either
3Francois (1998) examined the government provision of homecare subsidy in a model
with a limited number of ﬁrms and the frictions in the labor market leave positive proﬁts
in equilibrium. This meant that in his environment, the government was able to ﬁnance
teh childcare subsidy only by the taxes on the ﬁrm’s proﬁts not worker earnings. More
discussion follows in Section 5.
5be due to having more kids, having kids with special needs, or preferring
more intensive childcare services. This heterogeneity in required childcare
is assumed to manifest itself in the amount a household must pay to pur-
chase their required childcare in the marketplace. Speciﬁcally, the cost to a
household of purchasing their required childcare in the marketplace is given
by η ≥ e, where η is a random variable drawn from a increasing and con-
tinuous probability distribution function F on [e,∞). The key assumption,
however, is that if a household member supplies the required childcare him
or herself, he or she again pays a cost of e, or lose the same amount of leisure
as if he or she had worked, regardless of the required amount of childcare.
Intuitively, an individual must give up his or her day of free time if he or she
works or if he or she stays home to provide childcare, and moreover, there
are strong economies of scale in privately provided childcare—an individual
gives up the same amount of leisure by taking care of one child as if he or
she was took care of several children or took care of children with special
needs. Note also that the assumption that η ≥ e implies the utility cost to
privately providing childcare is always “cheaper” than purchasing it in the
market, implying F(e) = 0. 4
Households make decisions to maximize household utility, where house-
hold utility is a linear function of total household earnings minus any costs
of purchased childcare and the utility of any leisure given up for work or
privately providing childcare. Therefore, if we let wm denote the money the
male member of the household can earn in the labor market and let wf denote
the amount of money the female member of the household can earn in the
labor market, then household utility will equal the following. For households
who turn out not to have children, household utility equals wm +wf −e−e
if both members work, wm−e if only the male works, and wm−e if only the
female works. Alternatively, for those households who have children, house-
hold utility equals wm + wf − e − e − η if both members work, wm − e − e
if the male member works and the female member provides childcare, and
wf − e − e if the female member works and the male provides childcare.5
4We can easily modify the model to allow the time cost of supplying childcare to be
less than the time cost of working. Doing so does not change any results of the paper, but
does require us to introduce and carry around the extra parameter, and therefore we do
not do so.
5There is a large literature on intra-household bargaining. The maximizing household
net earnings preferences we assume in this paper are directly consistent with either house-
hold common preferences (Samuelson, 1956; Becker, 1981) or with households choosing
6Firms compete for workers in a competitive labor market. Moreover, ﬁrms
can observe each worker’s skill type and gender, but not whether each worker
has children or the costs associated with purchasing the required childcare for
these children. Firms hire workers by promising them a payment of w, where
w ≥ 0. When a ﬁrm hires a type-x worker and the worker stays and works
for the ﬁrm for a payment of w, the ﬁrm incurs a proﬁt of x−w. However, if
the ﬁrm hires a type-x worker, but that worker subsequently quits, the ﬁrm
doesn’t have to pay the worker, but the worker doesn’t produce anything and
the ﬁrm must incur an adjustment cost of q(x) > 0 for any x ∈ [x,x].6 We
also assume there is limited liability, meaning ﬁrms cannot force workers who
quit to subsequently pay this adjustment cost that result from this quitting.
The timing unfolds as follows. Firms randomly meet workers and observe
their gender and type. Each worker then receives simultaneous wage oﬀers
from ﬁrms. Each worker decides which oﬀer, if any, to accept. Households
are then formed between males and females assortatively in x, after which
a household learns the amount of childcare it is required to provide. Given
this required childcare, each household decides whether both members should
keep working and purchase this required childcare or whether one member
should quit the labor market and provide childcare internally. Individuals
who stay in the labor force produce output for their ﬁrm and are subsequently
paid by their ﬁrm according to the agreed contract. Since males and females
form households after joining the labor market and the labor market is large,
we assume that ﬁrms do not know who their employees marry at the time
contracts are formed.
Finally, assume the lowest skill type is such that (1−ρ)(x−e)−ρq(x) > 0
for all x ∈ [x,x]. This condition assures that it is possible for every female
worker to ﬁnd employment in equilibrium. Intuitively, this condition amounts
to assuming that even the lowest skilled workers are still moderately produc-
tive, and that the adjustment costs associated with a worker quitting do not
become prohibitively large even for very high skilled workers. We can de-
rive an equilibrium where these conditions are violated, however, in such an
equilibrium, some female workers would be completely blocked from joining
the labor market as employers would not hire them even at a wage of zero.
allocations through cooperative bargaining (McElroy and Horney, 1981; McElroy, 1990;
Chiappori, 1992).
6As alluded to in the introduction, q(x) is assumed to capture the ”quasi-ﬁxed” costs
of labor (Oi, 1962), including such things as recruiting and hiring costs, as well as the
costs required to train a new worker and lost institutional knowledge.
73 Discriminatory Equilibrium
Given the set-up above, optimal behavior for each individual with respect to
which oﬀer, if any, he or she should accept is very simple to characterize given
it is made before required childcare is realized. Essentially, an individual
should accept the highest paying oﬀer he or she receives, as long as that oﬀer
is greater than or equal to e, or greater than the value of the leisure time he
or she has to give up in order to work. If the maximum oﬀer an individual
receives is below e, the individual should reject all oﬀers.
Let us next consider each household’s optimal decision rule concerning la-
bor market participation subsequent to household formation. Given the util-
ity functions speciﬁed above, this decision is also relatively straightforward.
In households who don’t end up having children, any individual who accepted
a job oﬀer should continue working after forming a household. In households
who end up having children, each household’s optimal decision rule is as
follows: (a) If only one member accepted a job, the member who accepted
the job should continue working after forming a household, while the other
member should provide required childcare. (b) If both the male and female
household members accepted jobs and earn the same wage (wm = wf = w),
then both keep working and purchase required childcare if w ≥ η, but either
the male or female household member should drop out of the labor market
and privately provide required childcare if w < η. (c) If both the male and
female household members accepted jobs but the female (the male) in the
household earns a lower wage than her (his) spouse, then the male (the fe-
male) should stay in the labor market, while the female (the male) should
stay in the labor market and purchase required childcare if wf ≥ η (wm ≥ η),
but drop out and internally supply required childcare wf < η (wm < η).
Now let us consider a ﬁrm’s problem. After observing a worker’s type x
and gender s, say it believes that the worker will quit the job with probability
µs(x,w) given any wage payment level w. Given beliefs µ = (µm,µf), a ﬁrm’s
expected proﬁt associated with hiring a gender-s and type-x worker at a wage
w is
π = (1 − µs(x,w))(x − w) − µs(x,w)q(x). (1)
A ﬁrm wants to maximize expected proﬁts. To do so, a ﬁrm’s strategy
consists of a pair of wage payment functions, one for each gender, that maps a
worker’s type to a wage oﬀer. Speciﬁcally, a wage function oﬀered to gender-
8s workers is denoted ws(x). For simplicity, we assume that there are two
competing ﬁrms for each worker. This is enough to generate a competitive
outcome. Each worker’s choice decision, each household’s labor market par-
ticipation decision for both members, the two ﬁrms’ wage strategies (w∗
m,w∗
f),
and the ﬁrms’ beliefs µ∗ constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) if
(a) each household follows the optimal labor market participation decision
rule and each worker behaves optimally with respect to choosing an oﬀer,
(b) (w∗
m,w∗
f) is a Nash equilibrium of the two ﬁrms’ simultaneous-move wage
oﬀer game given µ∗, and (c) µ∗ is derived from the worker’s optimal decisions
using Bayes’ rule whenever possible. Moreover, we focus on the existence of
a discriminatory PBE where females are paid less than equally skilled males.7
This leads to Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 There exists a discriminatory PBE such that all ﬁrms oﬀer
the same wage to workers of the same type and gender, denoted by w∗
s(x) for
a worker of type-x and gender s, where (i) w∗













While the details to the proof of Proposition 1 can be found in the Ap-
pendix, the basic idea is relatively straightforward. In the competitive labor
market, equilibrium proﬁts for any ﬁrm equal zero. Hence, setting equation
(1) equal to zero and re-arranging, we get the following expression that must
hold for each ﬁrm’s wage oﬀer in equilibrium for a worker of type-x and
gender-s given beliefs µs,




If ﬁrms believe males will not drop out of the labor force in equilibrium,
then µ∗
m(x,w∗
m(x)) = 0 for all x ∈ [x,x], and the above zero-proﬁt condition
directly implies that males will be oﬀered a wage equal to their productivity
in equilibrium. On the other hand, if ﬁrms also believe that after forming
7In general, the notion of a self-fulﬁlling equilibrium tends to generate multiple equi-
libria. For examples, see Coate and Loury’s model (1993) of racial discrimination and
Mailath and Postlewaite’s model (2004) of social norms. This model is no exception.
Given we assume females and males come from identical skill distributions, there will also
be a PBE where males are paid less than equally skilled females, as well as a pooling PBE
where males and females are paid equally.
9a household females will drop out of the labor market with some positive
probability in equilibrium, then µ∗
f(x,w∗
f(x)) > 0. Equation (2) shows that
if this is the case, then a female of type-x will be oﬀered a salary less than
x, meaning females will be paid less than their equally skilled spouses.
Given males are paid more than their spouses, then according to the
optimal labor force participation rule, males will indeed always work, which
conﬁrms ﬁrm beliefs. Alternatively, females will drop out of the labor market
whenever wf < η . Therefore, for any given wage oﬀered to type-x females
such that wf < x, a fraction ρ[1 − F(wf)] of such females will drop out
of the labor market after forming a household. Since in equilibrium ﬁrms’




f(x))]. Therefore, for any given type-x, w∗
f(x) must be such that
w
∗
f(x) = x −
ρ[1 − F(w∗
f(x))]
1 − ρ[1 − F(w∗
f(x))]
q(x). (3)
Equation (3) reveals the form for the function g∗(x) presented in Proposition
1.
Proposition 1 implies that even though males and females constitute ex-
ante identical populations, there exists a PBE where females earn less and
are more likely to drop of the labor market than equally skilled males. Parts
(i) and (iii) of Proposition 1 capture the wage inequality between equally
skilled male and female workers in such a PBE. It is interesting to note that
the female worker’s equilibrium wage is strictly less than the male worker’s
equilibrium wage at every skill level even though wage payments are wholly
contingent on whether or not the worker quits. This occurs because a worker
has limited liability, so the ﬁrm cannot ask a worker who quits the job to
pay the ﬁrm’s adjustment costs associated with her quitting. This means
the gender wage gap g∗(x) is basically the equilibrium risk premium that
type-x females have to pay because of their higher equilibrium probability of
subsequently dropping out of the labor market after forming a household.
4 The Eﬀects of Childcare Subsidies on Gen-
der Inequality
In recent years, several “family oriented” policies have been either imple-
mented or proposed in both the U.S. and Canada. For example, in the
10Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, the U.S. Federal Government in-
troduced an annual $1000 tax credit for each child under the age of 17 in the
household. Similarly, in 2006, the Federal Government of Canada introduced
the Universal Child Care Beneﬁt, which provides monthly cash payments of
$100 for each with a child under age six in the household. Relatedly, govern-
ment provided universal pre-school was recently proposed in a ballot mea-
sure in California, and a $5/day government subsidized childcare program
was implemented in Quebec in 1997. While these policies have certainly
not been solely aimed at lessening gender inequality in the labor market,
several researchers and policy makers have suggested that such government
provision of childcare subsidies may be “potentially appealing instruments
for achieving a degree of (gender) equality in the labour market” (Cleve-
land, Gunderson, and Hyatt, 1996). Indeed, given the key role played by
childcare costs in generating gender wage and participation inequality in the
model developed above, a natural question to ask is how such gender inequal-
ity would be aﬀected by the implementation of diﬀerent types of childcare
subsidy programs.
Motivated by the types of childcare subsidies discussed above, we will
analyze the eﬀect of two basic government programs on gender labor market
inequality—a cash transfer approximating a child tax credit and an in-kind
beneﬁt approximating government provided childcare. A key component of
the analysis to follow however, is that in order to implement either of these
programs, the government must raise the tax revenue required to fund such
programs though proportional taxes on earnings.
(a) Cash Beneﬁt to those with Positive Homecare Requirements
Suppose the government subsidized homecare requirements by providing a
cash beneﬁt b to every household with positive childcare requirements funded
by a proportional tax t on the earnings of each worker. Finding the discrim-
inatory PBE given a homecare provision scheme such as this is actually very
similar to ﬁnding the discriminatory PBE in the absence of any government
provision program as done in Proposition 1. This leads to Proposition 2
(once again, see Appendix for proof).
Proposition 2 For any proportional tax t on labor earnings, there exists a
discriminatory PBE with a budget balancing cash beneﬁt b given to every
household with a positive childcare requirement such that all ﬁrms oﬀer the
same wage to workers of the same type and gender, and for any given type-x:
11(i) w∗
m(x,t) = x, (ii) µ∗
m(x,w∗
m(x,t)) = 0, (iii) w∗
f(x,t) = x − e g(x,t), where




The intuition for the above Proposition is as follows. Once again, it will
be true that ﬁrms make zero expected proﬁts in equilibrium. Therefore, as
above, for a worker of type-x and gender-s, each ﬁrm’s equilibrium wage oﬀer
must be such that ws = x−[µsq(x)/(1 − µs)]. Also like before, if ﬁrms believe
males will not drop out of the labor force (meaning µm = 0), then males will
be oﬀered a wage equal to their productivity type-x. However, females will
continue to be paid less than their equally skilled spouses if ﬁrms still believe
females will drop out of the labor market with some positive probability.
Therefore, given a proportional tax t and a cash beneﬁt of b that is allocated
to a household regardless of whether both members work or not, it will be
optimal for a type-x female member of the household to stay in the labor
market if and only if (1 − t)wf + b − e − η ≥ b − e, or equivalently, if and
only if (1 − t)wf ≥ η. Therefore, for a given wage wf < x, a fraction
ρ[1 − F((1 − t)wf)] of females of type-x will drop out of the labor market
with proportional taxation.
Given that ﬁrms’ equilibrium beliefs must correspond to the truth, it
must be true that µ∗
f(x,w) = ρ[1 − F((1 − t)w)]. Therefore, for any given
type-x and tax t, the equilibrium wage for females must be such that
w
∗
f(x,t) = x −
ρ

1 − F((1 − t)w∗
f(x,t))

1 − ρ[1 − F((1 − t)w∗
f(x,t))]
q(x). (4)
Similar to before, in the discriminatory PBE where females earn less than
males, the equilibrium wage w∗
f(x,t) for type-x females under proportional
taxation must solve equation (4) given any t. Unlike before however, to fully
describe equilibrium wages for females, we also must determine the budget
balancing cash beneﬁt b that can be maintained for any given t. In particular,















Moreover, the total expected expenditure associated with any given beneﬁt
b for this program is
e(b) = bρ. (6)
12Therefore, under any given proportional tax t, a discriminatory PBE with a
balanced budget for a cash beneﬁt given to all those with positive childcare
requirements can be derived by ﬁnding the w∗
f(x,t) and b that solves equation
(4) while simultaneously equating r(t) to e(b).
The above proposition reveals that government provision of cash child-
care beneﬁts to all households with positive childcare requirements will not
necessarily eradicate wage and participation inequality across equally skilled
workers of diﬀerent genders, as the discriminatory equilibrium still exists.
The following Corollary states an even stronger result.
Corollary 1 A government provided cash beneﬁt given to all households with
positive homecare requirements that is funded using a proportional tax on
earnings will unambiguously increase wage and participation inequality be-
tween equally skilled male and female workers in the discriminatory equilib-
rium where males earn more than equally skilled females.
The intuition for Corollary 1 comes from the condition required for a
female to stay in the labor market. In particular, recall that in the absence of
any government subsidy scheme, a female will only stay in the labor market
if wf ≥ η. However, as shown above, with a government provided cash
beneﬁt to households with positive homecare requirements that is funded
via proportional taxation, a female will only stay in the labor market if (1−
t)wf ≥ η. Note that for any given wf, the latter condition for working is more
restrictive than the condition for working in the absence of any government
provision. This highlights the fact that when a homecare beneﬁt is given
regardless of whether or not both household members work, there is no new
incentive for the household to choose the male member to drop out or any
added incentive for females to stay in the labor market. However, the tax
required to pay for the government subsidy lowers the incentive for females
to stay in the labor market. This lesser incentive to stay in the labor force
means more females will drop out of the labor force, which in turn will further
exacerbate gender wage inequality.
(b) In-Kind Childcare Beneﬁts
We showed above that, in this environment, gender wage and partic-
ipation inequality in a discriminatory equilibrium when a cash beneﬁt is
provided to all households with children is greater than in a discriminatory
equilibrium where no homecare subsidies are provided. Here we examine how
13gender inequality may be aﬀected if the government provision is made more
restrictive, namely by the providing childcare subsidy in-kind.
Speciﬁcally, let us consider a program that provides a fraction s of each
household’s required amount of childcare, where once again this program is
funded by a proportional tax t on earnings. This program has two distinct
eﬀects. First, for households where both members work, it lessens the cost of
purchasing their required childcare from η to (1−s)η. Second, for households
where only one member works, it lessens the amount of leisure time lost due
to providing childcare by the stay-at-home parent from e to (1 − s)e. The
interesting question is whether the inequality in a discriminatory equilibrium
will be greater than or less than the inequality that arises in the discrimina-
tory equilibrium without any government childcare subsidies.8 This leads to
the following Corollary.
Corollary 2 A government program that oﬀers an in-kind childcare subsidy
covering a fraction s of the childcare requirements for each household and is
funded via a proportional tax on earnings can increase or decrease wage
and participation inequality between equally skilled male and female workers
in the discriminatory equilibrium.
The intuition for Corollary 2 is the following. As discussed above, the
structure of this subsidy is such that if both members of the household work,
they will only have to spend (1−s)η on childcare. Alternatively, if the female
member drops out, she now only has to commit (1− s)e of her time providing
childcare given the government provision of childcare. Therefore, under an
in-kind subsidy program funded via a proportion tax on earnings, a household
where both members work will incur utility of (1−t)(wm+wf)−e−e−(1−s)η
for any given wm and wf, while a household where only the higher paid male
works will incur a utility of (1−t)wm−e−(1−s)e. This means that under an
in-kind childcare subsidy program funded via proportional taxation, a female
household member will only work if (1 − t)(wm + wf) − e − e − (1 − s)η ≥
(1−t)wm−e−(1−s)e, or equivalently, if and only if (1−t)wf−se ≥ (1−s)η.
The key thing to note is that since wf is increasing in x in equilibrium, this
last condition can be either more or less restrictive than the relevant condition
under no program (i.e. wf ≥ η) depending on the distributions of x and η
(which will aﬀect the maximum size of s for any given t) and the size of e.
8The existence of the discriminatory equilibrium under the in-kind childcare beneﬁts
program can be proved similarly as proved in Proposition 2.
14(c) Restricting Beneﬁts to Dual-Career Households Only
An important question that remains is whether there exists any government
childcare subsidy program that will unambiguously lead to lower wage and
participation inequality. The answer to this question is yes. In particular,
as will be shown below, the key to ensuring less wage and participation
inequality in this environment is to implement a program that lowers the
cost of working without increasing the beneﬁt to staying home. Therefore,
in this ﬁnal section, we consider programs that give a cash beneﬁt or an
in-kind beneﬁt to dual-career households only.9
Clearly, if dual-career households (and only dual-career households) were
promised a beneﬁt large enough to cover all of their required homecare re-
quirements, no one would ever drop out of the labor market, and consequently
there would no longer be a discriminatory equilibrium. However, in the ab-
sence of such an all encompassing subsidy plan, even a relatively restrictive
beneﬁt program that only gives childcare beneﬁts to dual-career households
will not unambiguously decrease gender wage and participation inequality in
this environment. In particular, consider the following Corollary.
Corollary 3 A government program that oﬀers a cash beneﬁt to only dual
career households with children that is funded via a proportional tax on earn-
ings can increase or decrease wage and participation inequality between
equally skilled male and female workers in the discriminatory equilibrium.
To understand the intuition for the above Corollary, once again let us
compare the relevant household utility levels of having both members work
versus having only the male work. If both members work, household utility
will equal (1 − t)(wm + wf) − e − e − η + b under the cash beneﬁt program
to dual-career households. Alternatively, household utility if only the male
works under the cash beneﬁt program to dual-career households will equal
(1−t)wm −e−e. This means, the relevant condition for it to be optimal for
both household members to work under the cash beneﬁt program to dual-
career households only is (1−t)wf +b ≥ η. From this expression it can then
be inferred that, under the cash beneﬁt program to dual-career households
only, it is possible for wage and participation inequality to go up over some
9The existence of a discriminatory equilibrium where males are paid more than equally
skilled females under each childcare program can be proved similarly as existence was
proved in Proposition 2.
15range of the x distribution if the x distribution has a long right-tail since
equilibrium wf rises with x.
Finally, consider this last Corollary regarding a government program that
oﬀers in-kind beneﬁts to dual-career households only.
Corollary 4 A government program that oﬀers an in-kind childcare subsidy
covering a fraction s of the childcare requirements for dual-career house-
holds that is funded via a proportional tax on earnings unambiguously de-
creases wage and participation inequality between equally skilled male and
female workers in the discriminatory equilibrium if average worker produc-
tivity exceeds the the average cost of purchasing required homecare across all
households (i.e.
R x
x xdG(x) > ρ
R ∞
e ηdF(η)).
Intuitively, under the in-kind program restricted to dual-career house-
holds, if both members work, household utility will equal (1−t)(wm+wf)−
e − e − (1 − s)η . Alternatively, under this program, if the female mem-
ber quits her job and stays home for childcare, household utility will equal
(1−t)wm−e−e. Therefore, both members will work if and only if
(1−t)
(1−s)wf ≥ η.
As one can see, this condition is less restrictive than the one without a child-
care program if t < s. A suﬃcient condition for t to be less than s in a
balanced budget equilibrium turns out to be
R x
x xdG(x) > ρ
R ∞
e ηdF(η), or
when the average productivity of each gender is greater than the average cost
of childcare across all households.
5 Summary and Discussion
The model developed in the ﬁrst part of this paper shows that women may get
paid less and have weaker participation in the labor market than men, even
without any signiﬁcant diﬀerences between gender groups. We should also
acknowledge however, that this model is highly stylized and may omit some
important issues. For example, a worker’s labor/leisure/homecare choice
is obviously much more complex than the binary work/not-work structure
assumed here, and households likely also diﬀer in terms of the amount of
utility “lost” by supplying their required homecare themselves (i.e. provid-
ing childcare to their own children). However, the essence of the self-fulﬁlling
mechanism for the discriminatory equilibrium we examine would not neces-
sarily be altered if we allowed for such greater complexity. The only necessary
conditions for the results in our paper to hold are for ﬁrms to not be able
16to require workers who quit to pay for the costs associated with hiring and
training a replacement, and for ﬁrms to believe females are more likely than
males to quit the labor market. These beliefs, along with the existence of hir-
ing/replacement costs, mean ﬁrms will pay females less than equally skilled
males. Then, as long as similarly skilled males and females choose to marry
each other, such a pay diﬀerential will mean that households will always ﬁnd
it optimal for the female member to supply less time to the labor market and
more to internally providing required homecare when the cost of purchasing
the required homecare becomes suﬃciently high. This conﬁrms ﬁrms’ be-
liefs, giving ﬁrms no reason to change their beliefs or their discriminatory
behavior.
The assumptions regarding the identical skill distributions and perfect
positive assortative marriage are also quite strong. However, they were only
made to keep things simple, and the existence of the discriminatory equilib-
rium is generally robust to some loosening of these assumptions. One way
to conﬁrm this is to note that a suﬃcient condition for the discriminatory
equilibrium we examine to hold is simply for households to be made up of
males and females who are “reasonably” close in type. To see this point more
precisely, a type-e x female worker’s equilibrium wage is unique in our discrim-
inatory equilibrium and it is equal to e x − g∗(e x). Let x be the type of the
spouse of a given type-e x female, meaning the male spouse’s equilibrium wage
is equal to x. Since the low income spouse leaves the job if the household’s
required homecare turns out to be suﬃciently high, the spouse who drops
out will be the female as long as e x − g∗(e x) < x. If husband’s type is greater
than wife’s type (i.e. e x < x), then this condition obviously holds. More
importantly, this condition shows that even if husband’s type is lower than
wife’s type, the discriminatory equilibrium can still be supported as long as
her type is not too much larger than her spouse’s. This means that even if
marriage is not perfectly positively assortative, or if it is, but the female skill
distribution stochastically dominates the male skill distribution by a small
amount, the discriminatory equilibrium we examine still exists.10
In the second part of the paper, we examined whether government home-
care subsidies may provide a way of eradicating or at least diminishing gender
inequality. Indeed, in the model presented in Francois (1998), such programs
necessarily help lower discrimination and gender labor market inequality.
10In fact, there is considerable empirical evidence that it is relatively rare for females to
marry males with substantially lower education than themselves (Qian, 1998).
17However, the results of our analysis showed that this will not always be the
case in outside of the dual-labor market environment he examines. In par-
ticular, the positive results in Francois stem from the fact that ﬁrms earn
positive proﬁts in equilibrium in his environment, so the government is able
to ﬁnance childcare subsidies by taxing ﬁrm proﬁts not worker earnings. This
means any negative labor market supply eﬀects of taxes on labor earnings
are absent in his paper. However, it is not hard to imagine that workers at
least partially bear the burden of ﬁnancing a government childcare subsidy
especially in a highly competitive labor market. Therefore, as we argued
above, the net eﬀect of childcare subsidy programs on gender inequality is
often ambiguous, and in general depends not only on the structure of the
childcare subsidy program, but also on the distribution of worker’s produc-
tivities and the market costs of childcare. As shown in Corollary 4, in this
environment, only when a childcare subsidy is given in-kind, and restricted
to dual-career households only, will gender wage and participation inequality
unambiguously fall in a discriminatory equilibrium.11
In summary, we think the model we presented in this paper represents
a new way of thinking about how gender wage and participation inequality
can arise and persist in a competitive labor market. Moreover, the model
shows how government childcare subsidies, especially those in the form of
cash beneﬁts given to all households with children such as those in the U.S.
Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 and the Canadian Universal Child
Care Beneﬁt of 2006, can potentially increase this inequality. Therefore,
when implementing a childcare subsidy program, careful consideration should
be given with respect to both how and to whom the beneﬁts will be allocated
if government is concerned about gender inequality in the labor market.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
To prove Proposition 1, ﬁrst note that in any discriminatory PBE where
females are paid less than equally skilled males, each household’s optimal
decision rule regarding labor participation under assortative marriage means
that males will never drop out of the labor force, while females will drop out
of the labor force whenever wf < η. Therefore, in any such equilibrium,
each ﬁrm’s beliefs are µ∗
m(x,w) = 0 and µ∗
f(x,w) = ρ[1 − F(w)] for all
11Even this result is only guaranteed if the worker’s average productivity is higher than
the average cost of childcare.
18(x,w). This shows that parts (ii) and (iv) of Proposition 1 must hold in the
discriminatory PBE.
Next, note that the ﬁrm’s equilibrium proﬁt by hiring any worker is zero
in the competitive labor market due to the argument in Bertrand competition
models. Therefore, the unique equilibrium wage for the type-x male worker is
w∗
m(x) = x for all x ∈ [x,x] given the ﬁrm’s equilibrium belief µ∗
m(x,w) = 0.
This conﬁrms that part (i) of Proposition 1 holds in the discriminatory PBE.
Applying the zero proﬁt condition in equilibrium and plugging µ∗
f(x,w) =
ρ[1 − F(w)] into equation (1), the equilibrium wage for the female worker of
type-x in the discriminatory PBE is expressed by equation (3).
Let h(w,x) = x−{ρ[1 − F(w)]q(x)/(1 − ρ[1 − F(w)])}. Note that a wage
cannot be lower than e to get any workers, nor higher than x for any x
since a ﬁrm would surely lose money if it oﬀered a wage greater than the
worker’s productivity. Therefore, h(w,x) is a function from [e,x] into a set
of real numbers. Next, note that (i) h(e,x) > e due to the assumption
(1 − ρ)(x − e) − ρq(x) > 0 and (ii) h(x,x) < x since we have 0 < F(x) < 1
and 0 < ρ < 1. Finally, h(·,x) is a continuous function in w, which implies,
together with (i) and (ii), that the image of h(w,x) is contained in [e,x]. Since
h(e,x) > e,h(x,x) < x, and h(·,w) is a continuous function from [e,x] into
[e,x], the ﬁxed point of h(·,x) exists. Let P(x) be the set of the ﬁxed points
of w = h(w,x). By Corollary 16.51 in Aliprantis and Border (1999), P(x) is
a non-empty compact set. The equilibrium wage w∗
f(x) is the maximal ﬁxed
point in the set P(x) because the ﬁrm can otherwise ﬁnd a proﬁtable wage
oﬀer. Given an the existence of the equilibrium wage schedule for females,





1 − ρ[1 − F(w∗
f(x))]
q(x).
Since ρ[1 − F(w∗
f(x))]/

1 − ρ[1 − F(w∗
f(x))]
	
and q(x) are both positive,
g∗(x) > 0 at all x ∈ [x,x]. This proves the existence of the discriminatory
PBE, and conﬁrms parts (i)-(iv) of Proposition 1. 
Proof of Proposition 2
In the discriminatory equilibrium, the male worker’s equilibrium wage is
again equal to his productivity type x since the ﬁrm believes that the male
worker will never quit the job. However, the ﬁrm believes that the female
worker may quit the job with a positive probability. Given that ﬁrms’ equi-
librium beliefs must correspond to the truth, it must be true that µ∗
f(x,w) =
19ρ[1 − F((1 − t)w)] as discussed in the text. Therefore, the equilibrium wage
for the female worker of type-x is the maximal ﬁxed point of equation (4).
The existence of such a ﬁxed point can be proved similarly as proved in
Proposition 1. The only diﬀerence between the proof for Proposition 2 and
that for Proposition 1 is that we also need to ﬁnd, for any given t, the maxi-
mal b that satisﬁes the balanced budget condition. As discussed in the text,
the government balanced budget condition requires r(t) = e(b). Using ex-
pressions (5) and (6), for any given t, the budget balancing cash beneﬁt b
is implicitly given by ﬁnding the w∗











Proof of Corollary 1
Note that ρ[1 − F(·)]/{1 − ρ[1 − F(·)]} is a decreasing function. Therefore,
for each type-x female worker, any proportional tax rate t ∈ (0,1), and any
w ≥ w∗
f(x), we have
w > x −
ρ[1 − F((1 − t)w)]
1 − ρ[1 − F((1 − t)w)]
q(x). (7)
Since the equilibrium wage w∗
f(x,t) for the type-x female worker under the
cash beneﬁts program is the maximal wage that equates the left-hand side
to the right-hand side in (7), w∗
f(x,t) must be strictly less than w∗
f(x) for all
x and all t ∈ (0,1). 
Proof of Corollary 2
Recall that the equilibrium wage for the female worker of type-x without
provision for homecare services is the maximal ﬁxed point of w = h(w0,x)
for all x. The equilibrium wage w∗
f(x,t) for the female worker of type-x is the
maximal ﬁxed point of w = d(w0,x,t,s) for a budget balancing (t,s), where
d(w,x,t,s) is deﬁned as

















The existence of the maximum ﬁxed point of w = d(w0,x,t,s) can be proved
similarly to Proposition 1. Given the deﬁnitions of d(w,x,t,s) and h(w,x),
the function d satisﬁes the following properties: for each x, (i) d(w,x,t,s) <
h(w,x) if w < se/(s − t), (ii) d(w,x,t,s) > h(w,x) if w > se/(s − t), and
(iii) d(w,x,t,s) = h(w,x) if w = se/(s − t). Let e x be the type of the female
20worker such that w∗
f(e x) = se/(s−t). Consider any female worker whose type
x is such that w∗
f(x) > w∗
f(e x). Since w∗




f(x). Therefore, there exists a ﬁxed point of w = d(w,x,t,s)
in the range (w∗
f(x),x], which implies that w∗
f(x,t) is greater than w∗
f(x).








is not certain whether there exists w ∈ (w∗
f(x),x] such that d(w,x,t,s) > w.
Therefore, it is uncertain whether the equilibrium wage for the female worker
whose type x such that w∗
f(x) − w∗
f(e x) is positive or negative. 
Proof of Corollary 3
The equilibrium wage w∗
f(x,t) for the female worker of type-x under the cash
beneﬁts program that gives the beneﬁt to dual-career households only, is the
maximal ﬁxed point of w = c(w0,x,t,b) for a budget balancing (t,b), where
c(w,x,t,b) is deﬁned as
c(w,x,t,b) = x −
ρ[1 − F((1 − t)w + b)]
1 − ρ[1 − F((1 − t)w + b)]
q(x)
Given the deﬁnitions of c(w,x,t,b) and h(w,x), the function c satisﬁes the
following properties: for each x, (i) c(w,x,t,b) < h(w,x) if w > b/t, (ii)
c(w,x,t,s) > h(w,x) if w < b/t, and (iii) c(w,x,t,b) = h(w,x) if w = b/t.
Let e x be the type of the female worker such that w∗
f(e x) = b/t. The properties
of the function c makes w∗
f(e x,t) = w∗
f(e x).Consider any female worker whose
type x is such that w∗
f(x) > w∗
f(e x). Since w∗
f(x) > b/t and w∗
f(x) is the
maximum ﬁxed point of w = h(w0,x), we have c(w,x,t,b) < h(w,x) < w
for all w ∈ (w∗
f(x),x]. Therefore, the equilibrium wage w∗
f(x,t) must be less
than w∗
f(x) for these types-x. Now, consider any female worker whose type
x is such that w∗
f(x) < w∗
f(e x). Since w∗
f(x) > b/t and w∗
f(x) is the maximum




This implies that her equilibrium wage w∗
f(x,t) must be higher than w∗
f(x)
for these types-x. Therefore, w∗
f(x) − w∗
f(e x) can be positive or negative
depending on x. 
Proof of Corollary 4
The equilibrium wage w∗
f(x,t) for the female worker of type-x under the
in-kind program for dual career households is the maximal ﬁxed point of
21w = z(w0,x,t,s), where z(w,x,t,s) is deﬁned as















If t < s, we have z(w,x,t,s) > h(w,x) for all (w,x), which implies that
w∗
f(x,t) > w∗
f(x) for all x. Under the in-kind childcare subsidy program
where the subsidy is given to dual-career households only, the total expendi-
















































x xdG(x) > ρ
R ∞
e ηdF(η), we have t < s. 
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